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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

vs.
CHRISTINA LYNN BRIGGS,
Defendant/Appellant.

District Court No. 071902062
: Appellate Court No. 20080567
:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a finding of guilt by a jury for Aggravated
Robbery, a first-degree felony, and Aggravated Kidnapping, a first-degree
felony.

The Defendant was found guilty on March 21, 2008.

She was

sentenced on May 27, 2008, to a term of five years to life in the Utah State
Prison on the aggravated robbery charge and fifteen (15) years to life in the
Utah State Prison on the aggravated kidnapping charge, to run concurrent with
one another. The Defendant is currently serving her sentence in the Utah State
Prison. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. §§78A-3-102(4) and
78A-4-103.

ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
POINT I
WAS THE DEFENDANT DENIED HER RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION
OF THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE
1, SECTIONS SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION BY HER ATTORNEY'S FAILURE TO
MOVE THE TRIAL COURT FOR A DIRECTED
VERDICT?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate court must determine as a
matter of fact and law whether the Defendant was denied her right to effective
assistance of counsel. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668, 80 L.Ed.2d
674 (1984), the United States Supreme Court articulated a two-part test, which
was adopted in State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), to determine
whether counsel was ineffective. The Court held that;
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose
result is reliable. Id. at 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693.
POINT H
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN
FAILING TO ENTER A DIRECTED VERDICT OR
AQUITTAL AT THE CLOSE OF THE PROSECUTION'S
CASE FOR THE REASONS THAT THERE WAS
2

INSUFFICENT
CONVICTION?

EVIDENCE

TO

SUPPORT

A

STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court should use a question of law
standard of review. "We reverse the jury's verdict in a criminal case when we
conclude as a matter of law that the evidence was insufficient to warrant
conviction."

State v. Smith, 927 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).

Furthermore, this Court should review the evidence "in a light most favorable
to the jury verdict," State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 876 (Utah 1985). Since
Defendant's attorney didn't move for a directed verdict, it should be reviewed
under a plain error standard of review. "[T]o establish the existence of plain
error and to obtain appellate relief from an alleged error that was not properly
objected to, the appellant must show the following: (i) an error exists, (ii) the
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful,
i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome for the appellant . . ." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah
1993).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
UTAH STATUTES
U.C.A §76-6-301. Robbery.
(1) A person commits robbery if:
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take
personal property in the possession of another from his person, or immediate
3

presence, against his will, by means of force or fear, and with a purpose or
intent to deprive the person permanently or temporarily of the personal
property; or
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate
force against another in the course of committing a theft or wrongful
appropriation.
(2) An act is considered to be "in the course of committing a theft or
wrongful appropriation" if it occurs:
(a) in the course of an attempt to commit theft or wrongful appropriation;
(b) in the commission of theft or wrongful appropriation; or
(c) in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission.
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree.

U.C.A. §76-6-302. Aggravated Robbery.
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing
robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1601;
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the course
of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a
robbery.
U.C.A. §76-5-301. Kidnapping.
(1) An actor commits kidnapping if the actor intentionally or knowingly,
without authority of law, and against the will of the victim:
(a) detains or restrains the victim for any substantial period of time;
(b) detains or restrains the victim in circumstances exposing the victim to
risk of bodily injury;
(c) holds the victim in involuntary servitude;
(d) detains or restrains a minor without the consent of the minor's parent or
legal guardian or the consent of a person acting in loco parentis, if the minor is
14 years of age or older but younger than 18 years of age; or
(e) moves the victim any substantial distance or across a state line.
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(2) As used in this section, acting "against the will of the victim" includes
acting without the consent of the legal guardian or custodian of a victim who is
a mentally incompetent person.
(3) Kidnapping is a second degree felony.

U.C.A §76-5-302. Aggravated Kidnapping.
(1) A person commits aggravated kidnapping if the actor, in the course of
committing unlawful detention or kidnapping:
(a) possesses, uses, or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in
Section 76-1-601; or
(b) acts with intent:
(i) to hold the victim for ransom or reward, or a as shield or
hostage, or to compel a third person to engage in particular conduct or to
forbear from engaging in particular conduct;
(ii) to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or flight
after commission or attempted commission of a felony;
(iii) to hinder or delay the discovery of or reporting of a felony; or
(iv) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another;
(v) to interfere with the performance of any governmental or
political function; or
(vi) to commit a sexual offense as described in Title 76, Chapter 5,
Part 4, Sexual Offenses.
(2) As used in this section, "in the course of committing unlawful detention or
kidnapping" means in the course of committing, attempting to commit, or in
the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a violation of:
(a) Section 76-5-301, kidnapping; or
(b) Section 76-5-304, unlawful detention.
(3) Aggravated kidnapping is a first degree felony punishable by a term of
imprisonment of:
(a) except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), (3)(c), or (4), not less than
15 years and which may be for life;
(b) except as provided in Subsection (3)(c) or (4), life without parole, if
the trier of fact finds that during the course of the commission of the
aggravated kidnapping the defendant caused serious bodily injury to another;
or
(c) life without parole, if the trier of fact finds that at the time of the
commission of the aggravated kidnapping, the defendant was previously
convicted of a grievous sexual offense.
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(4) If, when imposing a sentence under Subsection (3)(a) or (b), a court finds
that a lesser term than the term described in Subsection (3)(a) or (b) is in the
best interests of justice and states the reasons for this finding on the record, the
court may impose a term of imprisonment of not less than:
(a) for purposes of Subsection (3)(b), 15 years and which may be for
life; or
(b) for purposes of Subsection (3)(a) or (b):
(i) ten years and which may be for life; or
(ii) six years and which may be for life.
(5) The provisions of Subsection (4) do not apply when a person is sentenced
under Subsection (3)(c).
§78A-3-102. Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,
except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d).
78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to
issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review
of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the
Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and
Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire
and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the
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Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining,
and the state engineer;
(b) Appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the
state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those
involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital
felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence,
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the
sentence for a first degree or capital felony.
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs
challenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except
in cases involving a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases,
including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division,
child custody, support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and
paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original
appellate review and determination any matter over which the Court of
Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63 G,
Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency
adjudicative proceedings

UTAH CONSTITUTION
Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law.
7

Article I, Section 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance
shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance
money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in
whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or
at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate
discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Fourth Amendment
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
Sixth Amendment
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
g

to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
Fourteenth Amendment
Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
Section. 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number
of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right
to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice
President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the
Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the
Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such
State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or
in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime,
the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number
of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
Section. 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress,
or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or
military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having
previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of
the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an
executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of
the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against
the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress
may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
Section. 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States,
authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and
bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be
questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or
pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion
against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of
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any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal
and void.
Section. 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
RULE 17(P)
At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the
conclusion of all the evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing
any information or indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground
that the evidence is not legally sufficient to establish the offense
charged therein or any lesser included offense.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant was charged by Information with two separate offenses.
A jury found her guilty of counts one and two, aggravated robbery in violation
of U.C.A. §76-6-302 and aggravated kidnapping in violation of §76-5-302. (R.
135/P. 208).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On September 8, 2007, the Defendant, Christina Lynn Briggs,
accompanied Brandon Morris to the Timbermine restaurant where she was
scheduled to meet up with John Barlow. (R.134/P. 146-47, 171, 209). When
they met John Barlow, Defendant said that "her cousin" needed a ride up the
canyon. (R. 134/P. 147, 172). Mr. Barlow suggested taking his work van
rather than Defendant's car. (R.134/P. 147, 174). When Mr. Barlow started
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climbing into his van, Mr. Morris grabbed his left shoulder, and Mr. Barlow
felt a sharp object in his back. (R. 134/P. 147, 174). Mr. Morris made Mr.
Barlow sit in a steel chair between the two bucket seats, climbed into the
driver's seat and leaned over Mr. Barlow to unlock the passenger door for
Defendant.

(R. 134/P. 147-48, 175-76, 205-06).

Mr. Morris took Mr.

Barlow's keys and wallet, and Defendant took his cell phone. (R. 134/P. 148,
176).
Mr. Morris drove the van up Ogden Canyon and around the dam while
holding the knife to Mr. Barlow's left side.

(R. 134/P. 148, 178, 210).

Defendant bound Mr. Barlow's hands with a hoodie string. (R. 134/P. 185).
When they reach 9500 East and SR-39, Defendant threw Mr. Barlow's cell
phone out the window. (R. 134/P. 149, 181,210). Mr. Morris continued driving
past the Red Rock Cafe until he turned up a dirt road at approximately mile
marker 33.2 on SR-39. (R.134/P. 149, 183). Mr. Morris and Defendant drove
up that road about 100 yards, parked, and told Mr. Barlow to get out of the car,
then made him walk out into the woods about 20 yards. (R. 134/P. 149, 183,
211). Mr. Morris and Defendant then tied Mr. Barlow to a tree using a hoodie
string and soldering wire.

(R.134/P. 149-50, 185, 211). Mr. Morris and

Defendant then left Mr. Barlow tied to a tree. (R. 134/P. 187).
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Defendant and Mr. Morris got back in the van and left. (R. 134/P. 18788). Mr. Morris drove off fast and hit a big boulder that was partially buried in
the path. The boulder was ripped from the ground by the force and dragged
about 40 feet. (R. 134/P. 213). The undercarriage of the van was severely
damaged by the collision with the rock. (R. 134/P. 150, 189, 191). Mr. Morris
and Defendant then turned back onto the main road but only made it about 200
yards before the driveline snapped and the van broke down. (R. 134/P. 150,
189, 191). The van left a trail of transmission fluid beginning at the dislodged
boulder continuing to where the van became disabled on the road. (R. 134/P.
213). Mr. Barlow got himself untied and ran out to the road just in time to see
Mr. Morris and Defendant get into a white truck. (R. 134/P. 151, 188-190).
Defendant and Mr. Morris went to the Red Rock Cafe where they were
picked up by Steve Stefaniak and Jeanine Walton. (R. 134/P. 152-53; R.
135/P. 21). They then accompanied Steve and Jeanine to a campsite where
they partied and drank. (R. 135/P. 23; R. 135/P. 33-34, 49). They planned to
stay overnight at the campsite with Steven and Jeanine until Mr. Morris
realized he needed his insulin. (R. 134/P. 153; R. 135/P. 42-43). Jeanine drove
them to the Timbermine in an orange pickup where she intended to drop them
off at Defendant's car until Defendant spotted an undercover cop and told
Jeanine not to stop. (R- 134/P. 153; JL 135/P. 25). Jeanine dropped them off
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somewhere on Monroe, then went back up to the campsite and made
arrangements to meet them the next day. (R. 134/P. 153-54; P. 135/P. 26-27).
After Mr. Barlow became unbound, he ran to the disabled van. (R.
134/P. 190). Mr. Barlow managed to flag someone down and had them contact
the Weber County Sheriff. (R. 134/P. 191-92). When the police arrived, they
investigated the scene and found an empty spool of solder near the van. (R.
134/P. 192; R. 135/P. 13). They recovered the discarded cell phone (R. 134/P.
193), observed approximately 20 large scratch and puncture marks on Mr.
Barlow's left side, (R. 134/P. 212) and red lines around his wrists where it
appeared he had been bound. (R. 134/P. 213). The police found several items
near the campfire area where the van was parked while Mr. Barlow was being
tied to the tree as well as the string that was still tied to the tree to which Mr.
Barlow had been bound. (R. 134/P. 229; R. 135/P. 53). They did not locate
the soldering wire that had bound him to the tree. (R. 135/P. 13).
Mr. Barlow informed officers about the car in the Timbermine parking
lot. The police verified that the vehicle was registered to Defendant, and they
watched the car and waited for her to return for it. (R. 134/P. 215). When
Defendant failed to return for her car, the detectives executed a search warrant
on the vehicle and found the names of the Defendant and Mr. Morris in the
vehicle. (R. 134/P. 117). They also obtained the license plate number of the
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orange truck when they observed it driving through the parking lot. (R. 134/P.
154). The police then discovered Defendant and Mr. Morris were staying at
Mr. Morris's father's house and went and arrested them. (R. 134/155)
After taking the Defendant and Mr. Morris to the sheriffs office, they
interviewed Defendant.

Her testimony was that she and Mr. Barlow had

consensually decided to hang out and Mr. Barlow sexually assaulted her, then
Defendant called for help. (R. 134/159-60).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Defendant raises two points on appeal. First, her trial counsel was
ineffective when he failed to move the trial court for a directed verdict at the
conclusion of the State's case. Second, the trial court committed plain error
when it did not dismiss the case due to insufficiency of the evidence.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HER RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION
OF THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE
1, SECTIONS SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION BY HER ATTORNEY'S FAILURE TO
MOVE THE TRIAL COURT FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT.

The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the right to
counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel."
14

Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 692 (1984). In Strickland,
the Supreme Court established a two-part test to determine whether counsel's
assistance was ineffective.

"First, the defendant must show that counsel's

performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at
687,80L.Ed.2dat693.
In making that assessment, the Court in Strickland v. Washington gave
some guidance in noting, "[t]he proper measure of attorney performance
remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Id. at
688.

Although the Court in Strickland did not "exhaustively define the

obligations of counsel nor form a checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney
performance," Id. at 688, it did mention certain minimal requirements. These
duties include, "a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of interest" as well
as a duty "to consult with the defendant on important decisions and to keep the
defendant informed of important developments in the course of the
prosecution" Id. at 688. Additionally, the overreaching requirement by the
Supreme Court in ineffective assistance of counsel cases is that the
"performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable
considering all the circumstances." Id. at 688.
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Several other cases more specifically define when a defense counsel's
performance has slipped below the threshold cited above.
In the case of Kimmelman v. Morrison, All U.S. 365 (1986), the Court
was presented with a case where defense counsel, due to a failure to conduct
proper discovery, did not timely file a motion to suppress evidence under the
Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court found the attorney's performance to
be deficient. The Court stated:
Where defense counsel's failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment
claim competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness,
the defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is
meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the
verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence
in order to demonstrate actual prejudice.
Kimmelman v.
Morrrison, All U.S. 365, 375 (1986).
In making the determination that trial counsel's conduct failed to
comport with constitutional requirements, the Court held:
In this case, however, we deal with a total failure to conduct
pretrial discovery, and one as to which counsel offered only
implausible explanations. Counsel's performance at trial, while
generally creditable enough, suggests no better explanation for
this apparent and pervasive failure to "make reasonable
investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes
particular investigations unnecessary." [citation omitted] Under
these circumstances, although the failure of the District Court and
the Court of Appeals to examine counsel's overall performance
was inadvisable, we think this omission did not affect the
soundness of the conclusion both courts reached — that counsel's
performance fell below the level of reasonable professional
assistance in the respects alleged. Kimmelman v. Morrrison, All
U.S. 365, 386 (1986).
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The Utah Appellate Courts have adopted the Strickland test and have
likewise rendered decisions in ineffective assistance of counsel cases that can
guide a determination of when a defense attorney fails in his appointed duties.
In State v. Finlayson 2000 UT 10, f24, 994 P.2d 1243, the Supreme
Court of Utah affirmed this Courts reversal of the defendant's conviction
where the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel was key to the reversal.(See
State v. Finlayson, 956 P.2d 283 (Utah Ct.App.1998)). In that case, the Court
held:
That the facts in this case do not support a conviction for
aggravated kidnaping is clear from Couch and Jolivet. Yet
defendant's counsel made no objection to this charge, and failed
to raise this at any time, either during trial, or following the
conviction in a motion to vacate. As this is an issue that would
have been raised outside the presence of the jury, no possible
prejudice would have inured to defendant. When no possible
explanation or tactical reason exists for such a decision, we have
held that the first part of the Strickland test, is satisfied. {State v.
Finlayson 2000 UT 10, % 24, 994 P.2d 1243 citations omitted,
emphasis added.)
In the present case, defense counsel failed to move for a directed verdict
after the State rested. Assuming arguendo that defense counsel failed to make
a motion to the trial court that the trial court would have granted, this failure,
and this failure alone would constitute ineffective assistance of counsel under
the definition of Strickland and its Federal and State progeny. The general
practice of defense counsel in criminal trials is to move for a directed verdict or
17

motion to dismiss after the state has rested. This is especially true when the
state has failed to strongly establish one or more of the elements of the charge.
In the present case like in Finlayson, there is simply no reason for trial
counsel not to move the court for a directed verdict when the evidence against
the Defendant was that Mr. Barlow claimed she assisted Mr. Morris in the
actions, when defense counsel knew that Defendant was a former paramour of
Mr. Barlow and that he was likely developing a story and changing facts to
explain away damage to his truck, and to get back at Defendant for not
agreeing to be intimate with him. This failure clearly fiilfills the first prong of
the Strickland test.
The second prong of the test is whether "counsel's errors were so serious
as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable."
Strickland, at 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. Again, in the case of State
v. Finlayson 2000 UT 10, f 26, 994 P.2d this Court ruled that, "Accordingly,
we hold that defendant's counsel's failure to object to the aggravated
kidnapping charge rendered his performance constitutionally deficient and
prejudiced defendant".
In the case at bar, police ofiQcers were called to SR-39 because Mr.
Barlow claimed he had been assaulted by a knife. (R. 134/P. 207). The police
first responded to the Red Rock Cafe where the call had come from Dave
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Moss. Mr. Moss directed the officer to approximately mile marker 33.2 on SR39. (R. 134/P. 207). When the police arrived, Mr. Barlow was sitting in his
disabled Chevy work van. Deputy Oge spoke with Mr. Barlow who was pale
and visibly shaking.

(R. 134/P. 208).

Mr. Barlow claimed he had been

kidnapped by somebody with a knife after arranging by text message to meet
up with Defendant for dinner at the Timbermine restaurant. (R. 134/P. 20809). Mr. Barlow told Deputy Oge that an unknown white male was with
Defendant and that he was forced into his van at knifepoint and driven up
Ogden Canyon. Defendant took Mr. Barlow's cell phone and threw it out the
window after going through it.

(R. 134/P. 210).

When they reached

approximately mile-marker 33.2, they turned the van up a dirt road where they
parked the van. Mr. Barlow claimed the unknown white male made him get
out of the van, took his wallet, and made Mr. Barlow walk to the woods where
he tied Mr. Barlow to a tree using a hoodie string and solder wire from the
work van. (R. 134/P. 211). Deputy Oge observed a trail of transmission fluid
from the disabled van up to where Mr. Barlow said they had pulled off the road
and up into the dirt area. He also observed a string attached to a tree, evidence
on the ground around where the van was parked, multiple scratch marks, a
couple of puncture marks on Mr. Barlow's left side, and red lines around Mr.
Barlow's wrists. (R. 134/P. 212-13).
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After a short period, more detectives arrived to investigate the crime
scenes. The officers recovered Mr. Barlow's cell phone from where Defendant
had thrown it out the van window, an empty roll of solder outside the van
where it was disabled, and multiple items from the campsite near where Mr.
Barlow had been tied. The detectives did not recover any soldering wire from
where Mr. Barlow has been tied (R. 135/P. 13), they did not recover a knife (R.
135/P. 104), and no fingerprints were found on any of the recovered evidence
(R. 135/ P. 93) or in the van (R. 135/ 95-96). The officers did not find any
footprints leaving the van other than Mr. Barlow's. (R. 135/P. 13).
There are even discrepancies in Mr. Barlow's story.

During his

testimony, he stated that Mr. Morris asked him for his keys, wallet and phone
after climbing into the van at the Timbermine. (R. 134/P. 176). However,
Deputy Oge's testimony was that Mr. Barlow told him that he was forced to
give up his wallet after they parked up on the dirt road and Mr. Morris forced
him out of the van. (R. 134/P. 211). Mr. Barlow describes how his hands were
tied during his testimony (R. 134/P 186, 200), yet there is a question of how his
hands were tied and how he described it to the officers (R. 135/P. 12, 18-19).
Utah Code Annotated §76-6-302 lists the elements of aggravated
robbery. A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing
robbery, she:
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(a)
(b)
(c)

uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in
Section 76-1-601;
causes serious bodily injury upon another; or
takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle.

Utah Code Annotated §76-6-301 lists the elements of robbery. A person
commits robbery if:
(a)

(b)

the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to
take personal property in the possession of another from
his person, or immediate presence, against his will, by
means of force or fear, and with a purpose or intent to
deprive the person permanently or temporarily of the
personal property; or
the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of
immediate force against another in the course of
committing a theft or wrongful appropriation.

In the case at hand, the State did not prove all the elements of the
offenses charged. The State did not prove that the Defendant took or attempted
to take Mr. Barlow's personal property at all, much less against his will, by
means of force or fear. The wallet that was taken from Mr. Barlow was not
found in the Defendant's possession. Additionally, the State failed to prove
that there was a dangerous weapon involved. The investigators did not recover
a knife nor did they offer evidence that the scratches on Mr. Barlow's left side
were caused by a knife.

The scratches suffered by Mr. Barlow did not

constitute serious bodily injury. Finally, the State failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Defendant took or attempted to take an operable vehicle.
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Mr. Barlow testified that he volunteered his vehicle for the drive up the
canyon. (R. 134/P. 174).
Utah Code Annotated §76-5-302 lists the elements of aggravated
kidnapping.

A person commits aggravated kidnapping if the actor, in the

course of committing unlawful detention or kidnapping:
(a)
(b)

possesses, uses, or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as
defined in Section 76-1-601; or
acts with intent:
(i)
to hold the victim for ransom or reward, or a as
shield or hostage, or to compel a third person to
engage in particular conduct or to forbear from
engaging in particular conduct;
(ii)
to facilitate the commission, attempted commission,
or flight after commission or attempted commission
of a felony;
(iii) to hinder or delay the discovery of or reporting of a
felony; or
(iv) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or
another;
(v)
to interfere with the performance of any
governmental or political function; or

Utah Code Annotated §76-5-301 lists the elements of kidnapping. An actor
commits kidnapping if the actor intentionally or knowingly, without authority
of law, and against the will of the victim:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

detains or restrains the victim for any substantial period of
time;
detains or restrains the victim in circumstances exposing
the victim to risk of bodily injury;
holds the victim in involuntary servitude;
detains or restrains a minor without the consent of the
minor's parent or legal guardian or the consent of a person
22

(e)

acting in loco parentis, if the minor is 14 years of age or
older but younger than 18 years of age; or
moves the victim any substantial distance or across a state
line.

The State failed to prove the elements of the crime charged. The State did not
show that Defendant detained or restrained the victim for any substantial
period of time or in circumstances exposing the victim to risk of bodily injury.
The police found a hoodie string tied to a tree, but they did not recover the
soldering wire that Mr. Barlow claims was used to tie him to that tree. In
addition, no one saw Mr. Barlow tied to that tree. The State did not show that
Defendant moved Mr. Barlow any substantial distance.

Mr. Barlow

volunteered the use of his vehicle for the drive up the canyon and voluntarily
entered the vehicle for the drive. Defendant did not hold Mr. Barlow for
ransom.

Nor did the State prove that Defendant acted with the intent to

facilitate the commission or flight after commission of a felony or to hinder or
delay the discovery of or reporting of a felony as the State failed to prove that
any felony was committed. Finally, the State failed to prove that Defendant
possessed, used, or threatened to use a dangerous weapon.
Based on the insufficient evidence outlined above, Defendant's counsel
should have moved the court to dismiss the case. Under Rule 17(p) of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the trial court "may issue an order dismissing any
information ... upon the ground that the evidence is not legally sufficient to
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establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included offense." Defense
counsel did not raise that possibility for the trial court to decide.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN
FAILING TO ENTER A DIRECTED VERDICT OF
ACQUITTAL AT THE CLOSE OF THE PROSECUTION'S
CASE
FOR
REASONS
THAT
THERE
WAS
INSUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE
TO
SUPPORT
A
CONVICTION,
In State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^11, 10 P.3d 346, the Utah Supreme
Court held "as a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not
be raised on appeal."

However, this general rule is tempered when trial

counsel's performance falls below a reasonable standard. This Court further
stated "[i]t necessarily follows that the trial court plainly errs if it submits the
case to the jury and thus fails to discharge a defendant when the insufficiency
of the evidence is apparent to the court." Id. at 351 (emphasis added).
Defendant recognizes the difficult burden she must overcome in
challenging a trial court's failure to dismiss for lack of evidence. The Court's
power "to review a jury verdict challenged on grounds of insufficient evidence
is limited." State v. Rudolph, 2000 UT App. 155, ]f22, 3 P.3d 192. The Utah
Supreme Court has said, "[s]o long as there is some evidence, including
reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of the
crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops." State v. Mead 2001 UT 58,
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If67, 27 P.3d 1115, (citations omitted). Additionally, in State v. Workman, 852
P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993) the Court stated, "[ojrdinarily, a reviewing court
may not reassess credibility or reweigh the evidence, but must resolve conflicts
in the evidence in favor of the jury verdict.'5
The Utah Appellate Courts have, however, ruled that absent sufficient
evidence establishing each element of the offense charged, an appellate court
may overturn a conviction.

In State v. Workman, infra at 985, the Utah

Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's arrest of judgment from a conviction
of sexual exploitation of a minor holding: "A guilty verdict is not legally valid
if it is based solely on inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative
possibilities of guilt." In that case, the prosecution presented no evidence,
expert or otherwise, that the photograph in question could have been taken for
purposes of sexual arousal. Given that lack of evidence the Court vacated the
defendant's guilty verdict Similarly, in the case of State v. Petree, 659 P.2d
443 (Utah 1983), the Court reversed the conviction of a defendant in a seconddegree murder case where the evidence as to intent was deficient. In that case,
there was undisputed evidence that the victim had been murdered. The sole
evidence against the defendant consisted of the fact that the defendant was the
last person seen with the victim, and the fact that he had related a dream to
three individuals in which he recalled slapping the girl and that he "thought he
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hurt her. He thought he might have killed her." Id. at 446. In that case, the
Court also stated:
The fabric of evidence against the defendant must cover the gap
between the presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt. In
fulfillment of its duty to review the evidence and all inferences
which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most
favorable to the verdict, the reviewing court will stretch the
evidentiary fabric as far as it will go. But this does not mean that
the court can take a speculative leap across a remaining gap in
order to sustain a verdict. The evidence, stretched to its utmost
limits, must be sufficient to prove the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id at 444-445.
Furthermore, in the recent case of State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ^[18,
63 P.3d 94, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's conviction of
evidence tampering. In that case, there was some expert testimony that opined
that a second, smaller knife had also been used in the murder of an individual.
No other evidence as to a second weapon (the first weapon was recovered) was
found; but rather, the prosecution relied on an inference that the defendant had
the motive and opportunity to dispose of a second weapon. In reversing that
conviction, the Court held:
After giving full weight to all of the evidence supporting [the
defendant's] conviction of evidence tampering, we conclude that
the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. At most, the
evidence supports only the proposition that [the defendant] had the
opportunity to destroy or conceal the second implement, if indeed
it ever existed. Id. at f 18.
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While Defendant is cognizant of the requirement to marshal evidence in
support of the jury's verdict, Defendant submits that even with an extensive
marshaling of evidence the jury's verdict cannot be supported. It is undisputed
that there is no physical evidence connecting the Defendant to the crimes
charged.

There was no knife or soldering wire recovered, and what little

evidence was recovered had no connection to Defendant, and no fingerprints
were found. The only evidence connecting Defendant to the crime was the
testimony of Mr. Barlow, a former and possibly jealous paramour of
Defendant. Mr. Barlow's testimony was inconsistent on some very important
elements of the crimes he alleges were committed against him. He claimed
that Defendant took his cell phone, yet he changes his story of when it was
taken from him. Mr. Barlow's story of how he was tied to the tree was
inconsistent. In his testimony, he claimed his hands were bound in one way,
but when he spoke to police, he indicated his hands had been bound differently.
All of this notwithstanding, the State failed to prove all of the elements
of aggravated robbery and aggravated assault, which were out lined under
Point I. For this reason, the trial court should have dismissed the case when
Defendant's trial counsel failed to make a motion to dismiss. The evidence
was insufficient to convict Defendant of the crimes she was charged with.
Furthermore, all three elements of a plain error claim are present. The error
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exists. The error being that the State failed to prove all of the elements of the
offenses. Number two, this error should have been obvious to the trial court.
The final element is that the error was harmful. Based on the insufficiency of
the evidence Defendant should not have been convicted. Therefore, she was
prejudiced by the Court's failure to dismiss the case, and her convictions
should be reversed.

CONCLUSION
The State failed to prove all of the elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
Based on the lack of evidence, reasonable minds should have entertained a
reasonable doubt that Defendant committed the crimes she was convicted of.
For these reasons, Defendant respectfully requests this Court to reverse her
convictions.
DATED this j£_

day of Janua;y20k).

)ALL W. RICHARDS
Attorney for Appellant
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
fr rr

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs .

Case No: 071902062 FS

CHRISTINA LYNN BRIGGS,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

^x%

SCOTT M HADLEY
May 27, 2008

PRESENT
Clerk:
marykd
Reporter: COVINGTON, TRACY
Prosecutor: NATHAN D LYON
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): STUWERT B JOHNSON
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: May 10, 1973
Video

CD24328100

pages:

071902062 BRIGGS,CHRISTINA LYNN

CHARGES

1. AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 03/21/08 Guilty
2. AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 03/21/08 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State
Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING a 1st
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than fifteen years and which may be life in the Utah
State Prison.
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
Page 1

Case No: 071902062
Date:
May 27, 2008
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
The prison sentence imposed on each count in this case may run
concurrently to each other.
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
The Court recommends credit time served.
ALSO KNOWN AS (AKA) NOTE
CHRISTINA MEEHAN
CHRISTINA GARDNER

The defendant shall pay restitution in the amount of $1,250 to John
Barlow and $3,500 to Utah Mechanical Contractors. Restitution
shall be paid as a condition of parole and is to be paid joint and
serverally with the co-defendant, Brandon Lee Morris.
Dated this ^ y

day of

y^€^Uf
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P^.

^£> ££.

SCOTT M HADLEY
District Court Judge
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